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CHAPTER 1 
Real and Personal Property 
CORNELIUS J. MOYNIHAN 
In the annual business of the full bench of the Supreme Judicial 
Court, cases involving one or more aspects of the law of property con-
stitute a substantial portion of the litigation. Almost one fourth of the 
approximately two hundred decisions rendered with opinions during 
the survey year fall within the property field. They range in scope from 
adverse possession to zoning, and although some are of no special signifi-
cance, many reflect important developments, particularly with respect 
to landlord and tenant, vendor and purchaser, and zoning. 
Legislation affecting the law of property, enacted during the survey 
year or becoming operative during that period, will probably have a 
greater impact on both legal theory and practice than the decisional 
law. The new statute on t:he Rule Against Perpetuities and the Sub-
division Control Law, for example, will have a long-range effect diffi-
cult to appraise. 
The scope of this chapter is limited to those topics traditionally in-
cluded under the general heading of real and personal property. Spe-
cial treatment is given in subsequent chapters to the subjects of con-
veyancing, future interests, trusts, and mortgages. 
A. REAL PROPERTY 
§l.l. Vendor and purchaser. The perennial problem of the Statute 
of Frauds came before the Court in two cases. In Cluff v. Picardi 1 a 
CORNELIUS J. MOYNIHAN is Professor of Law at Boston College Law School. He is 
the author of A Preliminary Survey of the Law of Real Property (1940), and a con-
tributing author of American Law of Property (Part 7, Community Property) (1952). 
§l.l. '1954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 349, liS N.E.2d 753. 
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divided Court sustained a demurrer to a bill for specific performance 
of an agreement to sell a parcel of land brought against two defendants 
only one of whom had signed the memorandum. The bill did not 
allege that the defendant who signed the agreement was acting as agent 
for her codefendant as well as in her own behalf. The Court held that 
the fact of agency could not be assumed in favor of the pleader and, 
further, that the necessary allegation was not supplied by the statement 
in the bill that the paper annexed thereto and marked "A" was a 
memorandum of the agreement. 
The opinion contains a valuable suggestion on pleading. The Court 
pointed out that the plaintiff could have set up the agreement in general 
terms without stating whether it was oral or written, thereby leaving 
it to the defendants to plead the Statute of Frauds as a defense. This 
course, had it been adopted, would have taken the plaintiff beyond the 
demurrer stage. 
In Freedman v. Walsh 2 the often litigated question of the sufficiency 
of the memorandum of an oral purchase agreement was raised. The 
memorandum was held to comply with the statute despite the fact that 
the land was identified only by lot numbers without stating the town in 
which the lots were located.3 
An interesting application of the rule that the seller must tender to 
the buyer a marketable title to the land contracted to be sold is con-
tained in Guleserian v. Pilgrim Trust CO.4 The buyer brought an 
action to recover the amount of his deposit on a contract to purchase 
real estate on the ground that the seller could not convey good title. 
The alleged defect in the title consisted of grants of an easement of 
right of way made by the seller as mortgagee. The Court refused to 
determine the validity of the purported easements because the grantees 
of the easements were not before the Court, and held that the purported 
grants amounted to a cloud on the title because the buyer might be 
exposed to litigation by the owners of the alleged easements. The 
Court properly refused to enter into a guessing contest as to whether 
rhe purported grantees of the rights of way would institute litigation in 
the future. In the past the Court has not always been so careful in re-
fraining from adjudicating the validity of an alleged encumbrance even 
though all interested persons were not parties to the litigation. In Hill 
v. Levine,5 for example, the Court removed the alleged cloud on the 
title by determining that an equitable restriction imposed on the land 
had expired and that the restriction was not intended for the benefit of 
other lot owners who were not before the Court and would not, there-
fore, be bound by the decree. 
§1.2. Construction of deeds. A recital of the purpose of the con-
veyance is frequently found in older grants to cities, towns, and charita-
• 1954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 451, 119 N.E.2d 419. 
3 For an excellent brief discussion of the requirements for a sufficient memorandum 
see Epdee Corp. v. Richmond, 321 Mass. 673, 75 N.E.2d 238 (1947). 
• 1954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 489, 120 N.E.2d 193. 
"252 Mass. 513, 147 N.E. 837 (1925). 
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§1.2 REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY 5 
ble organizations. Such a litigation·breeding clause posed a problem 
of construction for the Court in Loomis v. City of Boston.1 In 1883 
land was conveyed to the city in fee, according to the habendum clause, 
"for the purposes of a public park." Thereafter the land was used by 
the city as a public park for more than fifty years. In 1951 the legisla-
ture authorized the city to sell or lease the land to Sears, Roebuck and 
CO.2 The petitioners, seeking to restrain a proposed sale or lease of 
the lands, brought a suit under the General Laws, Chapter 214, Section 
3(11), which provides for suits to enforce the purposes of any gift or 
conveyance to a municipal corporation "for a specific purpose or pur-
poses in trust or otherwise." The Court, relying heavily on the fact 
that the city had paid a substantial sum for the land, held that the 
words in the deed did not create a trust but merely stated the use to 
which the city intended to devote the land. 
In three cases the Court was called upon to construe deeds creating 
easements. Two of the cases, City of Revere v. Noonan 3 and Cadman 
v. Wills,4 involved questions as to the scope and extent of the easements. 
The third case, Kakas Bros. Co. v. Kaplan,5 required the Court to de-
termine the present validity of an easement of light and air created by 
a deed executed more than one hundred years ago. In 1853 the trustees 
of a church society owned a tract of land in the city of Boston bounded 
by Chauncy and Bedford Streets. The society'S church was then located 
on the corner of the lot. The trustees conveyed to one Perrin the 
southerly portion of the tract "saving and reserving to us Trustees as 
aforesaid for the benefit of said adjoining Church estate the right that 
no new outbuildings, or other structure shall ever be erected on the 
back part of the land hereby conveyed within thirty-eight feet of said 
back passageway which shall be higher than a point two feet six inches 
below the bottom of the Cap of the Vestry windows, in said Church." 
In 1867 the land on which the church building stood was sold to pri-
vate persons and in 1880 the building itself was removed and a new 
six-story building was erected on the site. In 1890 a five-story building 
was erected on the land conveyed to Perrin except that a one-story 
building was constructed on the land covered by the reservation in the 
Perrin deed. In course of time the whole area became devoted to com-
mercial and industrial uses. The plaintiff, present owner through 
mesne conveyances of the parcel conveyed subject to the easement, de-
sired to build above the one-story building and sought declaratory re-
lief as to his right to do so. 
The Court held that the reservation to the trustees in the deed to 
Perrin created a permanent, still subsisting easement of light and air 
over a portion of the plaintiff's land for the benefit of that portion of 
the original tract not conveyed to Perrin. The easement was created, 
§1.2. '1954 Mass. Adv. Sh. HI, 117 N.E.2d 539. 
• Acts of 1951, c. 199. 
31954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 51, 116 N.E.2d 566. 
• 1954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 167, 118 N.E.2d 94. 
51954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 353, 118 N.E.2d 877. 
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according to the Court's view, not for the benefit of the church building 
but for the benefit of the church land in order to enhance its value. 
The result reached is unfortunate in that it hampers maximum utiliza-
tion of land in the business district of a large city. The decision rests 
largely on an inference as to the probable intention of the trustees with 
respect to continued use of the retained portion of the tract for church 
purposes. It would seem that a preferable construction of the language 
of the reservation would have been to interpret the reference to 
"Church estate" and "windows in said Church" as showing an inten-
tion to make the easement appurtenant only to the church edifice. 
This view gains support from the fact that new structures were limited 
in height by the reservation not in terms of absolute measurement, such 
as number of feet, but solely with respect to the height of the windows 
in the then existing church building. Easements of light and air are 
not favored in the law and even when created by express grant the 
words of the grant might well be strictly construed.6 The decision in 
the instant case may, however, have been influenced by the practical 
construction put on the conveyance by the parties and their successors 
in interest as indicated by the conforming use made of the servient 
estate.7 
§1.3. Zoning decisions. The most significant decision relating to 
the topic of zoning was undoubtedly that of Pendergast v. Board of 
Appeals of Barnstable,! wherein the Court held that the Superior Court, 
on the hearing of an appeal from a decision of a board of appeals of a 
city or town, lacks the power to order the granting of a variance. The 
case is discussed in detail in the chapter on administrative law.2 
An interesting problem in rezoning was presented in Caputo v. 
Board of Appeals of Somerville.3 The plaintiff owned a lot of land at 
10 Tyler Street in the city of Somerville, where he conducted the busi-
ness of fabricating, cutting, and processing steel. He also owned a 
vacant lot of land at 9 Tyler Street, directly across from his place of 
business. He made plans to use the vacant lot for storing iron and 
steel and applied for a permit to construct a traveling hoist and crane 
to be used for picking up and storing the iron and steel which would 
be unloaded from trucks onto the lot.4 The permit was denied. The 
plaintiff brought suit to compel the issuance of a permit. At the time 
the permit was applied for, the plaintiff's vacant lot was included in a 
6 See Tidd v. Fifty Associates, 238 Mass. 421, 131 N.E. 77 (1921); Case v. Minot, 158 
Mass. 577, 33 N.E. 700 (1893); Keats v. Hugo, 115 Mass. 204 (1874). 
7 See 5 Restatement, Property §483, Comment to Clause (d) (1944). 
§1.3. '1954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 633, 120 N.E.2d 916. 
2 Section 14.25 infra. ~, ~ 
31954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 621, 120 N.E.2d 751. 
4 The facts stated are taken from the opinion in Caputo v. Board of Appeals of 
Somerville, 330 Mass. 107, III N.E.2d 674 (1953), and from the master's report in that 
case. There the Court remanded the suit to the Superior Court to allow the plain-
tiff to amend his bill so as to raise the question of the validity of the revised zoning 
ordinance enacted after the trial of the original suit. 
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large area zoned for light industry. Shortly thereafter the zoning ordi-
nance was amended so as to change a relatively small area, including 
the plaintiff's vacant lot, from an Industry A District to a Residence B 
District. By amended bill the plaintiff attacked the validity of the 
new ordinance as spot zoning. 
The Court held the rezoning ordinance illegal and void on the 
ground that it singled out "one small tract for different treatment from 
that accorded to similar surrounding land not shown to have been 
distinguishable from it in character, for no good reason unless it be to 
gratify one only of the owners in that tract." 5 The area which was 
changed to a residential district by the amendment consisted of a block 
bounded by four streets and comprising about 3.3 acres. Under the 
original zoning ordinance enacted by the city in 1925, part of this block 
was included in a business district and part in an industrial district. It 
was part of a general area zoned principally for industry. The block 
itself consisted of thirty lots predominantly residential in character.6 
At t::he time of the amendment, no lot in the block was being used for 
industrial purposes.7 
Although the Court did not explicitly adopt the petitioner's conten-
tion that the case was one of spot zoning, a contention difficult to sus-
tain in view of the number of lots contained in the block, it apparently 
thought that the same element of arbitrary action usually found in the 
spot zoning cases 8 vitiated the amendment in question. Whether the 
Court gave adequate consideration to factors that may have induced 
the city to make the change, such as potential increase in traffic con-
gestion, safety to pedestrians, and prevention of noise, is debatable. 
Rather than applying a presumption in favor of the validity of the 
ordinance, the opinion appears to throw on the city the burden of 
showing that its action was not unreasonable.9 
In a case of first impression, the Court in Pioneer Insulation and 
Modernizing Corp. v. City of Lynn 10 construed the meaning of a sec-
tion in a zoning ordinance providing for loss of a nonconforming use 
5 It is to be noted that the Court is referring to a possible reason for the zoning 
change. The record itself does not support an inference that the change was made 
because one of the property owners in the area requested it. Compare the attitude of 
the Court in Simon v. Needham, 311 Mass. 560, 566, 42 N.E.2d 516, 519 (1942): "It 
cannot be assumed that the voters in following the recommendations of the [plan-
ning] board were activated by the reasons mentioned by the board .... 'We do not 
know what other considerations were advanced for the passage of the amendment. 
... The action of the voters is not to be invalidated simply because someone pre-
sented a reason that was unsound or insufficient in law to support the conclusion for 
which it was urged." 
6 Record, p. 8. 
7 Ibid. 
S See, e.g., Smith v. Board of Appeals of Salem, 313 Mass. 622, 48 N.E.2d 620 (1943); 
Whittemore v. Building Inspector of Falmouth, 313 Mass. 248, 46 N.E.2d 1016 (1943); 
Leahy v. Inspector of Buildings of New Bedford, 308 Mass. 128, 31 N.E.2d 436 (1941). 
Cf. Marblehead v. Rosenthal, 316 Mass. 124,55 N.E.2d 13 (1944). 
• Cf. Lamarre v. Commissioner of Public Works of Fall River, 324 Mass. 542, 87 
N.E.2d 211 (1949); Simon v. Needham, 311 Mass. 560, 42 N.E.2d 516 (1942). 
10 1954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 639,120 N.E.2d 913. 
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by discontinuance for a specified time. The ordinance of the re-
spondent city authorized nonconforming uses in existence at the time 
of its adoption and then recited: "When a non-conforming use has been 
discontinued for a period of one year, it shall not be re-established and 
future use shall be in conformity with this ordinance." The Court 
found it unnecessary to pass on the validity of this section of the ordi-
nance because error of the trial court in another respect required that 
the case be remanded for a new trial. However, the Court thought it 
not "inappropriate to point out some of the factors to be considered 
in determining whether a non-conforming use has been discon-
tinued." 11 The Court then went on to define "discontinued" as 
equivalent to abandoned and stated that for abandonment to occur 
there must be both the intent to abandon and voluntary conduct, 
affirmative or negative, which carries the implication of abandonment.!2 
Nonoccupancy of premises and suspension or cessation of business due 
to reasons beyond the owner's control do not constitute a discontinu-
ance, the Court asserted, and mere lapse of time is not the decisive 
factor. 
§lA. Meaning of the term "lot" in a zoning ordinance. When a 
zoning ordinance, in restricting the uses to which land may be put, 
speaks in terms of a "lot," does the word "lot" mean: (1) a subdivision 
shown on a plat or map, (2) a parcel of land under single ownership 
irrespective of plats and surveys, or (3) an area put to a specific use? 
Generally the word has no fixed and inflexible meaning. It derives its 
meaning from its context and the particular circumstances under which 
it is used.! And a "lot" may include two lots, as illustrated by Vetter 
v. Zoning Board of Appeal of Attleboro.2 In that case an ordinance 
of the respondent city adopted in 1942 prohibited the future erection 
in single residence districts of a dwelling house "on a lot" containing 
less than 12,000 square feet, "but nothing contained in this section 
shall prevent the erection ... of any building on any lot . . . con-
taining a smaller area, provided such lot on the effective date hereof 
does not adjoin other land of the same owner available for use in con-
nection with said lot." The ordinance further recited: "No lot on 
which a dwelling house ... is situated, whether heretofore or here-
after placed, shall be reduced in area if such lot is smaller than is hereby 
11 1954 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 642, 120 N.E.2d at 916. 
'" Cases from other jurisdictions are in accord with this view. Ullman v. Payne, 
127 Conn. 239, 16 A.2d 286 (1940); Wood v. District of Columbia, 39 A.2d 67 (Mun. 
Ct. App. D.C. 1944); Haller Baking Company's Appeal, 295 Pa. 257, 145 Atl. 77 
(1928). 
§IA. 1 Corden v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Waterbury, 131 Conn. 654, 41 A.2d 
912 (1945); Lehmann v. Revell, 354 Ill. 262, 188 N.E. 531 (1933); Burde v. City of St. 
Joseph, 130 Mo. App. 453, 1I0 S.W. 27 (1908). The Massachusetts Subdivision Control 
Law defines lot as meaning "an area of land in one ownership, with definite 
boundaries, used, or available for use, as the site of one or more buildings." G.L., c. 
41, §8IL; cf. §8IQ. 
2330 Mass. 628, 1I6 N.E.2d 277 (1953). 
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prescribed, or if by such reduction it would be made smaller than is 
hereby prescribed." 
At the time this ordinance took effect the plaintiff owned a tract in 
a single residence district comprising lots 11 and 12 as shown on a plat 
on file at the assessors' office. He had acquired the so-called "lots" from 
different sources of title and at different times. Each lot contained 
slightly more than 6000 square feet. On "lot 11" was located a house 
and garage. In 1944 the plaintiff sold "lot II" and later desired to 
build on "lot 12." He was refused a building permit and denied a 
variance. The Court sustained the action of the board of appeal on 
the ground that on the effective date of the ordinance the whole tract 
owned by the plaintiff constituted one lot containing more than 12,000 
square feet and, therefore, the saving provision for smaller lots was in-
applicable. The Court was of the opinion that the purpose of the 
exception in the ordinance was "to save a person who at the time when 
the ordinance took effect had a vacant tract of a total area less than 
12,000 square feet from the hardship of not being able to use it at all 
for residence purposes"; the Court also said, "We find nothing in this 
record to suggest that lots under the ordinance were to be determined 
by assessors' plans or assessments or according to sources of title." 3 It 
is clear that the Court was primarily concerned with effectuating the 
basic purpose of the ordinance despite the obstacles of defective drafts-
manship.4 
§1.5. Legislative developments. Two statutes! designed to mod-
ernize the law of real property in areas in need of reformation were 
enacted during the 1954 legislative session. The first of these statutes 
represents a skillfully executed attack on some of the anomalies and 
hypertechnical applications of the Rule Against Perpetuities.2 In the 
process of eliminating some of the "rules" that have encrusted the Rule, 
the statute imposes a time limit on the duration of possibilities of re-
verter and rights of entry for condition broken arising from the crea-
tion of determinable fees and fees on condition subsequent.3 
The second statute streamlines conveyances between husband and 
• 330 Mass. at 630,116 N.E.2d at 278. 
• For a comparable result reached under the mechanic's lien statute, see Orr v. 
Fuller, 172 Mass. 597, 52 N.E. 1091 (1899); Batchelder v. Rand, II7 Mass. 176 (1875); 
Menzel v. Tubbs, 51 Minn. 364,53 N.W. 653 (1892). 
§1.5. 1 Acts of 1954, c. 641, adding Chapter 184A to the General Laws; Acts of 
1954, c. 395. 
2 For a detailed discussion of the statute by one of the draftsmen, see Section 3.1 
infra. 
3 Chapter 184A, §3. Cf. G.L., c. 184, §23 (limiting to the term of thirty years "Con-
ditions or restrictions, unlimited as to time"). See Flynn v. Caplan, 234 Mass. 516, 
126 N.E. 776 (1920). The new statute takes effect on January 1, 1955, and is prospec-
tive in operation. Additional legislation is necessary to deal with the problem of 
presently existing possibilities of reverter and rights of entry created under ancient 
deeds and wills. A draft of a statute directed toward this problem will probably 
be introduced in the 1955 legislative session. 
7
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wife by authorizing the creation of a tenancy by the entirety by a direct 
conveyance from a husband to himself and his wife.4 
§1.6. Miscellaneous problems. The failure of a register of deeds, 
acting as assistant recorder of the Land Court, to enter an order of tak-
ing of land in the daily sheet or entry book was held not to invalidate 
the taking in L. L. Brown Paper Co. v. Department of Public Works.1 
In holding that the performance of his statutory duty by the register 
is not a condition precedent to the validity of registration, the Court 
said: "It is the duty of the assistant recorder to comply with the statutes 
when a paper is offered for filing and registration. If a party present-
ing a paper, in this case the department, does all that is required of it 
to cause the paper to be filed and registered, there is no further obliga-
tion on such party to follow up or supervise the performance by the 
assistant recorder of his official duty." 2 The Court was careful to point 
out that no rights of third parties were involved.3 
The capacity of foreign trustees to convey Massachusetts land arose 
in Assessors of Everett v. Albert N. Parlin House, Inc.4 The Court ap-
plied the general rule that a foreign trustee has no authority to convey 
land in another state, apart from statutory permission granted by the 
state of the situs, even though the land in question was not land owned 
by the testator but had been purchased by the trustees in the course of 
administering the trust.5 It may well be that the holding can be ex-
plained by the fact that the issue of capacity to convey arose in a tax 
abatement proceeding with the burden of proof resting "upon the one 
claiming an exemption from taxation to show clearly and unequivocally 
that he comes within the terms of the exemption." 6 
B. LANDLORD AND TENANT 
§1.7. Covenant of renewal of lease. The recurrent and important 
problem of the rights of a lessee who has duly exercised a privilege of 
renewal but has not obtained a new written lease or a formal extension 
of the old lease was presented in O'Brien v. Hurley.1 One Newton 
• Acts of 1954, c. 395. For further discussion of this statute see Section 2.12 infra. 
§1.6. 1330 Mass. 496, 115 N.E.2d 496 (1953). 
• 330 Mass. at 501, 115 N.E.2d at 499. 
B See Gillespie v. Rogers, 146 Mass. 610, 16 N.E. 711 (1888). 
• 1954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 389, 118 N.E.2d 861. 
5 The trustees could have obtained, it would seem, a license from the Probate 
Court to sell the land. G.L., c. 203, §17A. 
61954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 389, 393, 118 N.E.2d 861, 864. 
§1.7. 11954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 189, 117 N.E.2d 922. The same case was before the 
Court in O'Brien v. Hurley, 325 Mass. 249, 90 N.E.2d 335 (1950). In that case the 
p1aintiff·lessee sought specific performance of an option to purchase contained in 
the lease. The option granted was exercisable "at any time during the term of this 
lease." Relief was denied on the ground that after the expiration of the original 
term of the lease there had been no extension of the term despite the fact that the 
lessee had duly given notice of the exercise of his option to renew the lease. 
8
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leased to the plaintiff certain premises for a term of two years com-
mencing on April 1, 1938. The lease gave to the lessee "the right or 
option of renewal of the within lease" for a further term of eighteen 
years at a higher rental, provided the lessee gave the lessor written no-
tice of his election to renew "at least sixty days before the expiration of 
this lease ... " In addition, the lease gave the lessee an option to 
purchase "at any time during the term of this lease" at a specified 
price. In October, 1939, the lessee gave to the lessor's agent and. at-
torney in fact a written notice of his desire to renew the lease. This 
agent informed both the lessor and the lessee that this notice consti-
tuted a renewal of the lease and thereafter both parties to the lease 
assumed that the lessee was occupying the premises under a renewal of 
the lease. The plaintiff has continued in possession ever since. 
In April, 1948, the lessor conveyed the reversion to the female de-
fendant. The purchase and sale agreement recited that the premises 
were to be conveyed "free from all encumbrances except the lease now 
held by Mr. O'Brien" and possession of the premises was to be delivered 
to the grantee "free of all tenants, except for such tenancy created by 
the said lease . . ." 2 The land had previously been registered, and 
the certificate of title listed under encumbrances the lease to the plain-
tiff "2 yrs. fro April 1, 1938 (with option of renewal & option to pur-
chase)." The deed to the defendant recited that the conveyance was 
subject to leases mentioned in the grantor's certificate of title. The 
plaintiff demanded that the defendant convey the premises to him in 
accordance with the terms of the option to buy. On her refusal the 
plaintiff brought this bill to enforce both the option to renew 
and the option to purchase. The trial judge entered a decree or-
dering the grantee to execute a renewal lease in favor of the plaintiff 
but otherwise denying relief to the plaintiff. Both parties appealed. 
The Court reversed the decree and ordered the bill dismissed on the 
ground that in order to bind the parties to the lease "for the further 
term it was necessary for the plaintiff to show that he had either a new 
lease for the additional term or a formal extension of the existing lease 
or something equivalent thereto." 3 By his occupancy after the initial 
term the lessee became a tenant at will. "There was no renewal or ex-
tension of the lease and the holding over by O'Brien under what at most 
was an implied oral agreement with Newton cannot be enforced against 
the female defendant who without notice of such agreement purchased 
the property more than eight years after the expiration of the lease." 4 
~'~The decision, though buttressed by the authority of prior cases, ig-
nores the doctrines of specific performance and equitable conversion. 
The lessee, having given the prescribed notice of his election to renew 
the lease, had a specifically enforceable right to a new lease.5 If, upon 
2 Record, pp. 278, 279. 
81954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 189, 191, 117 N.E.2d 922, 923. 
'1954 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 192, 117 N.E.2d at 924. 
• Linden Park Garage v. Capitol Laundry Co., 284 Mass. 454, 187 N.E.2d 849 (1933); 
Judkins v. Charette, 255 Mass. 76, 151 N.E. 81 (1926); Leominster Gas Light Co. v. 
9
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the expiration of the original term, the lessor had brought an action of 
summary process to recover possession, the lessee would have had an 
effective equitable defense to the action.s It is difficult to understand 
how the lessee lost his equitable right to a new lease. The defendant 
grantee, if not chargeable with actual notice of the plaintiff's rights, 
was chargeable with notice of those facts which an inquiry of the lessee 
would have disclosed.7 
Much of the confusion in the cases dealing with a lessee's right of 
renewal results from a failure to distinguish between a case where the 
lease prescribes the method of exercising the option and the lessee com-
plies with the required formalities and one where the lease gives a right 
of renewal in general terms and the lessee holds over without affirma-
tively exercising the option. In the leading case of Leavitt v. Maykel,S 
for example, the lease gave the lessees "the privilege and right to renew 
this lease after its expiration, for the further term of two years, upon 
the same terms and conditions of this lease." At the end of the term, 
the lessees remained in possession for eigln months and then vacated, 
giving the lessors only three days' notice of their intention to quit. The 
lessors brought an action to recover rent for the next two months on 
the ground that the lessees had renewed the lease by holding over and 
paying rent. It was held that the lease had not been renewed and that 
the defendants' only liability was as tenants at will. The actual basis 
of the decision appears in the Court's statement that "what occurred 
was not equivalent to an arrangement that the term should be ex-
tended and both parties bound for two years more." 9 The Court's 
statement that "without a formal renewal or something equivalent to 
- it" 10 the term was not extended was not inappropriate in view of the 
facts, but it has been uncritically applied in later cases to basically dif-
ferent situations. 
Thus, in Hanna v. County of Hampden ll the Court ignored the fact 
that the lessee had exercised the option to renew by giving written no-
tice to the lessor, and held that after the expiration of the original term 
the lessee was at most a tenant at will and therefore not entitled to 
Hillery, 197 Mass. 267, 83 N.E. 870 (1908); Ferguson v. Jackson, 180 Mass. 557, 62 
N.E. 965 (1902). Cf. Baseball Publishing Co. v. Bruton, 302 Mass. 54, 18 N.E.2d 362 
(1938); see also 1 American Law of Property §3.86 (1952). 
6 Ferguson v. Jackson, 180 Mass. 557, 62 N.E. 965 (1902). 
7 Cunningham v. Patee, 99 Mass. 248, 252 (1868): "The authorities fully support 
the doctrine in equity that one who purchases an estate, knowing it to be in the 
possession of a tenant, is bound to inquire into the nature of the tenant's interest, 
and will be affected with notice of the extent thereof. According to this principle, 
the known possession of the plaintiff as tenant was sufficient notice to Stevens [the 
transferee of the lessor] of the fact that she had a written lease, and of its contents, 
including the covenant to renew." And see Leominster Gas Co. v. Hillery, 197 Mass. 
267, 83 N.E. 870 (1908). 
8203 Mass. 506,89 N.E. 1056 (1909). 
9203 Mass. at 510, 89 N.E. at 1058. 
10 203 Mass. at 509, 89 N.E. at 1057. 
ll250 Mass. 107, 145 N.E. 258 (1924). 
10
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damages for the taking of the property by eminent domain. The Court 
relied exclusively on the Leavitt case, supra, and stated that it was de-
cisive of the case at bar. The Hanna case, in turn, was relied on in 
Wit v. Commercial Hotel Co.12 and D. A. Schulte, Inc. v. Brockton 
Y.M.C.A,l3 Although none of these cases involved the right of the 
lessee to specific performance, they were cited by the Court in the 
O'Brien case as authority for the proposition that it was necessary for 
the plaintiff "to show that he had either a new lease for the additional 
term or a formal extension of the existing lease or something equivalent 
thereto." 14 
§1.8. Covenants to indemnify the lessor. Indemnity clauses in 
leases whereby the lessee agrees to hold harmless the lessor from assorted 
acts of negligence on the part of the lessor are a peculiarly hardy breed 
of covenant. In 1945 the legislature decided to outlaw them as "against 
public policy," but the statute was expressly made applicable "only to 
leases and rental agreements entered into" after October 1, 1945i In-
demnity covenants in pre-existing leases continue to be valid, and in 
Manaster v. Gopin,2 decided in 1953, it was held that the statute did 
not make void such a covenant during the term of an extension of the 
original lease, even though the extension became effective after the 
cut-off date of the statute. In that case two floors of a building were 
leased to the plaintiffs' testator for a term of two years beginning on 
September 1, 1944, with a right in the lessee "to renew this lease for 
the further term of three years on the same terms and conditions of this 
indenture. And failure of the Lessee to give notice in writing to the 
Lessor one hundred days prior to the expiration of the term herein pro-
vided of his intention to vacate the premises by him occupied, at the 
expiration of the term, shall constitute a renewal of this lease as is 
herein provided." 3 The lease also contained a covenant on the part 
of the lessee to save the lessor harmless from loss or damage occasioned 
by the escape of water on the premises or by the bursting of pipes. 
The lessee, and on his death the plaintiff executors, continued to occupy 
the premises until February, 1948. No written notice of intention to 
vacate at the end of the original term was given to the lessor. In Feb-
ruary, 1948, damage to personal property of the plaintiffs was caused by 
a broken steam pipe, and an action was brought against the lessor to 
recover for the damage. 
The Court held that the indemnity covenant barred recovery because 
the original lease was in effect at the time of the damage to the plain-
tiffs' property. The Court construed the automatic renewal clause of 
the lease as amounting to an extension rendering unnecessary "the 
1.2 253 Mass. 564, 149 N.E. 609 (1925). 
13 273 Mass. 335, 173 N.E. 414 (1930). 
"1954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 189, 191, 117 N.E.2d 922, 923. 
§1.8. 1 Acts of 1945, c. 445, §2. 
2330 Mass. 569, 116 N.E.2d 134 (1953). 
3330 Mass. at 570, 116 N.E.2d at 135. 
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formality of executing a new lease." 4 Alternatively, the Court stated 
that the lease could well be treated as one for five years terminable by 
the lessee at the end of two years by giving notice of intention to va-
cate. 5 
§1.9. Assignment of leases. The right of an assignee of a lease to 
rid himself of the obligation of the covenants in the lease by making a 
further assignment to a person carefully selected for his financial irre-
sponsibility was reaffirmed in 1954 in Shoolman v. Wales Manufactur-
ing CO.l Since normally the only basis of the assignee's liability to pay 
rent and to perform the other covenants of the lease running with the 
land is that of privity of estate, it is elementary that a further assign-
ment of the leasehold by the assignee extinguishes his liability. The 
original lessee continues, of course, to be liable to the lessor on a con-
tractual basis despite his assignment.2 And the lessor may protect him-
self against a rent-evading assignment by the first assignee by providing 
in the lease that no assignment shall be made without his written con-
sent and then requiring as a condition of that assent that the assignee 
expressly assume the covenants in the lease.3 
Whether an alleged transfer of his estate by the assignee amounts to 
an effective assignment of the leasehold is often a disputed question, as 
it was in the Shoolman case. The instrument of assignment must be 
delivered to the second assignee and must vest in the latter the right to 
possession for the unexpired residue of the term without the retention 
of a reversionary interest in the transferor. If the assignment is not 
under seal, an actual entry by the assignee is necessary to make the 
transfer effective.4 
• 330 Mass. at 572, 116 N.E.2d at 137. Compare O'Brien v. Hurley, 1954 Mass. Adv. 
Sh. 189, 117 N.E.2d 922, discussed in Section 1.7 supra. The opinion contains no 
discussion of whether the failure of the lessee to give notice of an intention to vacate 
constituted a "rental agreement" within the meaning of Section 2 of Chapter 445 of 
the Acts of 1945. 
• See I American Law of Property §3.86 (1952). 
§1.9. '1954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 233, 118 N.E.2d 71. Accord: 68 Beacon St. v. Sohier, 289 
Mass. 354, 194 N.E. 303 (1935); Donaldson v. Strong, 195 Mass. 429, 81 N.E. 267 (1907); 
and see I American Law of Property §3.61 (1952). 
• Walker v. Rednalloh Co., 299 Mass. 591, 13 N.E.2d 394 (1938); Mason v. Smith, 
131 Mass. 510 (1881); see 1 American Law of Property §3.61 (1952). 
• This was done in 68 Beacon St. v. Sohier, 289 Mass. 354, 194 N.E. 303 (1935), and 
the Court held that the assignee continued to be liable on his own covenants despite 
a subsequent assignment by him. Under the rule of Dumpor's Case, 4 Coke 119b, 
76 Eng. Rep. 1110 (K.B. 1603), a consent by the lessor to one assignment destroys 
his right to object to a further assignment. In Aste v. Putnam's Hotel Co., 247 Mass. 
147, 141 N.E. 666 (1923), the Court adopted the rule of Dumpor's Case. It is not 
clear whether the lessor, in order to avoid the rule, can effectively condition his assent 
to the assignment with a provision that there shall be no further assignment. See 
1 American Law of Property §3.58 (1952). 
• Gorin v. Stroum, 288 Mass. 6, 192 N.E. 90 (1934); Sanders v. Partridge, 108 Mass. 
556 (1871). In the Shoolman case the Court emphasized the fact that the instrument 
of assignment was under seal. It is difficult to see in principle why a seal should 
make any material difference. 
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§l.lO. Governmental rent control. The constitutionality of the 
Massachusetts Rent Control Act was upheld in Russell v. Treasurer and 
Receiver General.1 A petition by twenty-five taxable inhabitants was 
brought to enjoin the expenditure of state funds to carry out the pur-
poses of the statute (Acts of 1953, Chapter 434) on the ground that the 
act deprived owners of controlled housing accommodations of due proc-
ess and of equal protection of the laws. The principal attack was lev-
eled at those provisions of the statute exempting from control newly 
constructed, changed or converted housing, vacant housing, and hous-
ing renting for more than $150 per month.2 The Court held that the 
statutory classification was not arbitrary and that the act considered in 
its entirety "establishes a system of rent control which is reasonably 
calculated to increase the number of residential housing units of the 
class in which there is the most pronounced shortage and by gradually 
relieving the existing emergency to promote a return of the housing 
situation to a more normal basis." 3 
The plan adopted by the legislature in its effort to cushion the im-
pact of decontrol of housing accommodations was to make control a 
matter of local option and local administration. From the administra-
tive standpoint the system is one of municipal rent control rather than 
state rent controJ.4 The statute does prescribe maximum rents and 
civil and criminal penalties, but broad powers are given to the local 
rent boards to make individual and general adjustments of maximum 
rents, and even to remove rent ceilings from any class of accommoda-
tions. The function of the state is limited to reimbursing those cities 
and towns which elected to retain rent control in the amount of 40 
percent of expenditures, and in furnishing the services of a rent coordi-
nator. The only powers of the rent coordinator are to prescribe forms, 
to advise local boards, and to approve and certify expenditures of the 
boards.5 The lack of any supervisory power in the coordinator, plus 
the absence of any reporting requirement by the local boards, makes 
difficult any attempt to evaluate the act in operation. It has undoubt-
edly been successful in preventing sudden and extreme increases in rent 
in those cities and towns where rent control has been retained. It is 
probable that thousands of individual adjustments of rent have been 
made by the rent boards on applications of landlords but no statistics 
are available. Nor is it known how many, if any, complaints have been 
§1.l0. 1 1954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 571. 120 N.E.2d 388. 
2 Acts of 1953. c. 434. §2(b)3. 
31954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 571. 578. 120 N.E.2d 388. 392. 
• As of December I. 1954. rent control was in force in thirty-one cities and nine-
teen towns in the Commonwealth. 
• The state rent coordinator may. according to an informal opinion of the Attorney 
General. withhold approval and certification of expenditures if in his judgment they 
are excessive. Informal Opinions of the Attorney General. November 12. 1953. In 
another informal opinion the Attorney General ruled that the powers and functions 
of the office of state housing rent coordinator did not terminate on June 30. 1954. 
but by virtue of the Acts of 1954. c. 496 (extending rent control for an additional 
nine months) continue to March 31. 1955. Informal Opinions of the Attorney Gen-
eral. July 15. 1954. 
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entered in the District Courts under Section 6 of the act by persons 
"aggrieved by any action, regulation or order of the rent board." The 
vacuous provision that a District Court "shall be authorized to take 
such action with respect thereto as is provided" in the declaratory 
judgment statute6 poses an interesting, but as yet unaswered, question 
as to the scope of judicial review of the administrative action of the 
rent board. 
C. PERSONAL PROPERTY 
§l.ll. Problems of possession. Relatively few cases in the field 
of personal property came before the Court during the survey year. 
Of these one of the most interesting is Stuart v. D. N. Kelley & Son, 
Inc.,! dealing with the problem of the existence of a bailment. In that 
case the plaintiff owned a fishing vessel which he delivered to the de-
fendant's shipyard for repairs. The boat had just returned from a 
fishing trip, and in a locked compartment on the boat were fishermen's 
clothing and supplies. This property was stolen during a period when 
no watchman was on duty. The plaintiff brought an action of contract 
or tort to recover the value of the stolen property. The trial judge 
found and ruled that a bailment for the mutual benefit of both parties 
was created, that the defendant knew "or it is reasonable to assume that 
it should have known that a large fishing boat . . . is very likely to 
have ... fishing clothes and foodstuffs aboard," 2 and that the theft 
was due to the defendants' negligence. The judge found for the plain-
tiff and denied a request by the defendant for a ruling that the de-
fendants' duty with respect to the stolen property "would rise no higher 
than a gratuitous bailee." 3 
The Court held that the denial of the requested ruling was error on 
the ground that the evidence supported neither a finding that the de-
fendant actually knew that the plaintiff's property was aboard the 
vessel nor a finding that the defendant had reason to know that this 
property was aboard, and that in the absence of such knowledge, ex-
press or implied, there was no bailment for hire. Because of the form 
of the defendants' requested ruling the decision was restricted to a 
holding that there was no bailment for hire, but it is clear from the 
opinion that the Court was of the view that there was not even a gra-
tuitous bailment. The Court stated, somewhat cautiously, that knowl-
edge or consent on the part of the bailee is no less essential for the 
creation of a gratuitous bailment than of one for hire.4 On the facts 
it would seem that the defendant was an involuntary bailee of the 
• G.L., c. 231A. 
§1.11. 11954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 83, 117 N.E.2d 160. 
21954 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 84, 117 N.E.2d at 161. 
s 1954 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 85, 117 N.E.2d at 162. 
• The Court conceded that there were intimations to the contrary in D. A. Schulte, 
Inc. v. North Terminal Garage Co. 291 Mass. 251, 257, 197 N.E. 16, 20 (1935) and 
Rogers v. Murch, 253 Mass. 467, 471, 149 N.E. 202, 203 (1925). 
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§l.ll REAL AND PERSONAL PROPE~TY 17 
plaintiffs clothing and supplies because of his possession of the boat 
and its contents,5 but as involuntary bailee the defendant would not be 
liable for the loss of the goods.6 Only rarely does unwitting possession 
serve as a basis of civil liability. 
But that an unwitting possession may be the basis of criminal liability 
is illustrated by Commonwealth v. Lee.7 In that case the defendant 
was found guilty on a complaint charging her with being found in 
possession of marijuana in violation of General Laws, Chapter 94, 
Section 211. At the trial the Commonwealth introduced evidence that 
the defendant received from a mail carrier a small package, wrapped in 
brown paper, addressed to the defendant. Police officers saw the de-
livery of the package to the defendant and immediately interrogated 
her while she had the package unopened in her hand. At the direction 
of the officers she opened the package. It contained four marijuana 
cigarettes. An officer asked her if they were marijuana and she an-
swered, "Yes, marijuana. Somebody's trying to frame me." 
Adopting the definition of possession of a chattel as set forth in the 
Restatement of Torts,S the Court held that the evidence warranted a 
finding that the defendant had possession of the cigarettes. The Court 
thought it unnecessary to consider "whether there was sufficient evi-
dence that the defendant knew or had reason to believe that the pack-
age contained marijuana, until she opened it," because "We are unable 
to distinguish in principle the present case from the Mixer case." 9 
In the Mixer case it had been held that a common carrier or his 
servant could be convicted of illegally transporting intoxicating liquor 
in a barrel although he did not know, and had no reason to believe, 
that it contained such liquor. No problem of possession arose in the 
Mixer case. The reliance on the Mixer decision by the Court in the 
Lee case demonstrates the Court's view that the crime with which the 
defendant was charged does not require a specific intent or con-
sciousness of the nature of the act, but to say that the case is indis-
tinguishable from Mixer blurs the distinction between the statutes in-
volved in the two cases. When the legislature uses a word of variable 
meaning such as "possession," it is open to inquiry whether the word 
5 "A bailment may be defined as the rightful possession of goods by one who is 
not the owner." 4 Williston, Contracts §1032 (rev. ed. 1936). As to the point of 
possession, see Commonwealth v. Lee, 1954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 181, 117 N.K2d 830; I Re-
statement, Torts §216 (1934). 
• Sawyer v. Old Lowell National Bank, 230 Mass. 342, 119 N.E. 825 (1918). 
71954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 181, 117 N.E.2d 830. 
8 The Restatement defines a person in possession of a chattel as "one who has 
physical control of a chattel with the intent to exercise such control on his own be-
half, or, otherwise than as servant, on behalf of another ... " §216. The difficulty, 
of course, lies in the meaning of the word "intent." Does a person who has possession 
of a container also have possession of its contents when they are unknown to him? 
The Court thought not in D. A. Schulte, Inc, v. North Terminal Garage Co., 291 
Mass. 251, 257, 197 N.E. 16 (1935), but that case would not necessarily control the 
Lee case because of the size of the container and other circumstances. 
91954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 181, 183, 117 N ,K2d 830, 832. The case referred to by the 
Court is Commonwealth v. Mixer,207 Mass. 141,93 N.E. 249 (1910). 
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is used in the sense of knowing possession or possession without regard 
to a specific intent to control. The question is always one of legisla-
tive intent to be determined from the legislative history, the over-all 
objective of the statute, the evil at which it is aimed, and the probable 
consequences of one construction as opposed to the other.lo Because 
of the serious evil of the drug traffic and the unlikelihood that an inno-
cent person would be in unknowing possession of a prohibited drug, 
the result reached in the Lee case is undoubtedly sound, but the tech-
nique used in reaching that result is debatable. 
§1.12. Fixtures. A single case involving fixtures called for the 
application of well-established rules to a factual situation representa-
tive of. the growth and development of a new industry. In Bay State 
York Co. v. Marvix, Inc'! the Court held that four air-conditioning 
units and a water tower installed in an office building by the owner of 
the building remained personal property as against a purchaser of the 
realty at a foreclosure sale under a prior mortgage. 
The Court, recognizing that the decisive question was the objec-
tively manifested intent of the owner, was of the opinion that "the 
installation was probably tentative and in the nature of an experi-
ment." 2 The plaintiff, who was the conditional seller of the equip-
ment, was held entitled to remove it from the building. 
lOCommonwealth v. Mixer. 207 Mass. 141. 93 N.E. 249 (1910) passim. 
§1.l2. '1954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 459. 119 N.E.2d 727. 
"1954 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 464. 119 N.E.2d at 730. 
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